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CruMINAL PRoCEDURE-.JuRIEs-EFFECT oF DISQUALIFIED JuROR ON 
THE VERDICT-Defendant was convicted of selling whiskey and imprisoned 
in the county jail. After the time for appeal had elapsed he discovered that 
one jury member had been an unpardoned convict. In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding the defendant urged that the judgment was void and subject to collateral 
attack. The county court refused to discharge the defendant. On appeal, held, 
· affirmed. Discovery after the verdict that a convict sat on the jury, contrary 
to statute,1 gives an automatic right to a new trial. However, since the defect 
only renders the verdict voidable and not void it must be challenged within 
the time allotted for appeal or motion for a new trial and it cannot be the subject 
of a collateral- attack in a habeas corpus proceeding. E.x parte Bronson, (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1952) 254 S.W. (2d) 117. 
The discovery after the verdict that a disqualified person sat on the jury 
is generally held not an automatic ground for a new trial.2 However, the 
defect may be a sufficient basis for a new trial in the discretion of the court 
where it appears that reasonable diligence was exercised to discover the defect 
on voir dire,8 and that the defect probably caused an unjust verdict.4 These 
two requirements must be proved by compelling evidence. The :inajority of 
1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) art. 616. 
2 See annotation, 126 A.L.R. 518 (1940). 
8 Piper v. Flagg, 92 N.H. 405, 32 A. (2d) 324 (1943); Cottman v. Federman Co., 
71 Ohio App. 89, 47 N.E. (2d) 1009 (1942). 
4 James v. State, 68 Ark. 464, 60 S.W. 29 (1900); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 
Pa. 432, 62 A. 1064 (1906). 
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the courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts and grant new trials because of 
a disqualified juror, because it is feared that should they do so "as soon as the 
accused was convicted the trial of jurors would begin."5 Some courts, however, 
will grant a new trial merely upon the showing that a disqualified person sat 
on the jury and that the defect was urged on the court within the time allotted 
for a new trial or appeal. 6 Of the courts following the minority approach, some 
distinguish among the various statutory disabilities concerning jury service 
and hold that there is an automatic right to a new trial only where the juror 
was physically or mentally incompetent or an unpardoned convict.7 No reason 
has been advanced for the inclusion of unpardoned convicts in this class beyond 
the old common law requirement that a jury be composed of twelve "good and 
true" men.8 A very few courts have ventured the theory that the participation 
of a juror who is not qualified to sit completely voids the verdict.9 However, 
the cases in which this theory was presented were decided on direct appeal 
and not on collateral attack.1° Furthermore, later cases in these jurisdictions 
have largely explained away the dicta in the earlier decisions.11 
The operation of the majority and minority approaches can best be explored 
in the light of three different fact situations. (I) The party who subsequently 
complains about the defect may have failed to question the juror in regard to 
the disqualification on voir dire. The majority of the courts, in this instance, 
would probably deny the motion for a new trial on the ground that reasonable 
diligence has not been shown by the moving party.12 The minority view, on 
5 Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 415 at 422 (1844). Motions for new 
trial have been denied where it was discovered after the verdict that some of the jurors were 
not on the jury list as selected by the jury commissioners, Morgan v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
543, 67 S.W. 420 (1902), or were not citizens of the state, People v. Evans, 124 Cal. 206, 
56 P. 1024 (1899), or were aliens, Neal v. Neal, 181 Mich. 114, 147 N.W. 624 (1914), 
or were interested in the outcome of the suit, Daniels v. Lowell, 139 Mass. 56, 29 N.E. 
222 (1885), or had expressed completely prejudicial statements prior to and during the trial, 
Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P. (2d) 507 (1939), or were 
related to the opposing party, Lumber Co. v. Moss, 186 Ark. 30, 52 S.W. (2d) 49 (1932), 
or were younger than the statutory age limit, Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215 (1883), or 
older, Blair v. Paterson, 131 Mo. App. 122, 110 S.W. 615 (1908), or were unpardoned 
convicts, Goad v. State, 106 Tenn. 175, 61 S.W. 79 (1900); State v. Wilson, 230 Mo. 
647, 132 s.w. 238 (1910). 
6 See Netter v. Louisville R. Co., 134 Ky. 678, 121 S.W. 636 (1909), for a repre-
sentative decision. See also 126 A.L.R. 518 (1940). 
7 Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S.E. 757 (1937). See also State v. Levy, 187 
N.C. 583, 122 S.E. 386 (1924). 
s Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 337, 77 S.E. 189 (1913). 
9Williams v. State, note 8 supra; Garrett v. Wienburg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341 
(1898). The court in the principal case overruled dicta to the same effect in Johnson v. 
State, 129 Tex. Crim. 162, 84 S.W. (2d) 240 (1935). 
10 See note 9 supra. 
11 E.g., State v. Kennedy, 177 S.C. 195, 181 S.E. 35 (1935), explaining Garrett v. 
Wienburg, note 9 supra. 
12 Morley v. Cranmore Skimobiles, (D.C. N.H. 1946) 67 F. Supp. 812; Alexander 
v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 30 A. (2d) 757 (1943). There may be a possible 
exception to the rule where questioning would have been fruitless. See Moore v. Farmers' 
Mutual Ins. Assn., 107 Ga. 199, 33 S.E. 65 (1899). See also Sinsheimer v. Edward Weil 
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 129 S.W. 187, where the court held that denial of a new 
trial was within the trial court's discretion even though counsel was prohibited by statute 
from asking the juror whether he had ever been convicted of a crime. 
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the other hand, would not deny the motion for this reason, since diligence 
need not be shown.13 (2) The complaining party may question the disqualified 
juror but receive a false answer. Clearly in this situation the minority courts 
will grant a new trial.14 However, the matter is still not free from difficulty 
under the majority rule. A few courts adhering to the majority view insist that 
the falsification be intentional,15 while others require that the question asked 
on voir dire be specific and not general.16 Further, the majority rule requires 
that the verdict be "probably unjust" before a new trial will be granted.17 (3) 
The complaining party's challenge for cause may be erroneously overruled by 
the trial court. The minority courts grant a new trial in this situation without 
hesitation,18 while the majority will grant a new trial if some prejudice to the 
complaining party can be shown.19 Seemingly, the majority approach operates 
as fairly to the complaining party in every instance as does the minority view, 
and carries with it none of the disadvantages of trial inconvenience and un-
certainty of verdict that follow in the wake of the minority view. The require-
ment that the verdict must be at least "probably unjust" appears eminently 
sound. The requirement that the unsuccessful party must show that he 
exercised reasonable diligence to discover the defect on voir dire is based upon 
the principle that in the absence of such diligence the party has waived any 
right he may have to complain. 20 Some courts have attacked this requirement 
on the theory that a party cannot waive what he does not know.21 The answer 
to this contention is simply that negligent ignorance works a waiver in the 
same manner as actual knowledge.22 In the principal case the court held that 
the defendant could not complain about the disqualified juror after the time 
for direct appeal had elapsed, since the defect only made the verdict voic;lable 
and not void. However, had the defendant made a timely appeal or motion 
for new trial, the court indicates that it would have been granted "without 
13 See 1 THOMPSON, TRIALS §116 (1912). 
14 Olympic Realty Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W. (2d) 293 (1940). 
15 Waeckerly v. Colonial Baking Co., 228 Mo. App. 1185, 67 S.W. (2d) 779 (1934); 
Lane v. Vaselius, 137 Misc. 756, 244 N.Y.S. 585 (1930). 
16 Lankford v. Thompson, 354 Mo. 220, 189 S.W. (2d) 217 (1945); Priest v. 
Cafferata, 57 Nev. 153, 60 P. (2d) 220 (1936). 
11 Meier v. Edsall, 192 Okla. 529, 137 P. (2d) 926 (1943); Kuzminski v. Waser, 
314 Ill. App. 438, 41 N.E. (2d) 1008 (1942). 
18 Klyce v. State, 79 Miss. 652, 31 S. 339 (1902); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
Krayenbuhl, 70 Neb. 766, 98 N.W. 44 (1904). 
19 A usual requirement is that the complaining party's peremptory challenges were 
exhausted, since otherwise he might have removed the offensive juror, or that upon the 
removal of the offensive juror by peremptory challenge he had none left to use upon other 
jurors. See Goad v. State, note 5 supra. 
20 Turley v. State, 74 Neb. 471, 104 N.W. 934 (1905); Queenan v. Territory, 11 
Okla. 261, 71 P. 218 (1901). 
21Bristow v. Commonwealth, 15·Gratt. (56 Va.) 634 (1859). 
22 State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1905); State v. Clarke, 34 Wash. 
485, 76 P. 98 (1904). 
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regard to a showing of injury or probable injury or of consent or waiver."28 
While the result in the principal case seems sound, the reasoning is based upon 
the minority view and is therefore subject to question. 
Joseph M. Kortenhof, S.Ed. 
23 Principal case at 121. 
